Commentary on the success of the U.S. surge in Iraq is often coupled with praise for the Sunnis who abandoned the insurgency and joined the U.S. in the War on Terror. However, all are not happy with the grassroots Sunni's newfound success. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki allegedly fears that the 70,000 members of the Sunni Awakening Councils (SAC) could one day become a rogue militia threatening the power and influence of Iraq's central government. Considering, however, that elements of the largest Sunni bloc in Iraq's parliament continue to actively and ideologically support terror, the emergence of a Sunni political force that has renounced terror should seem to be a welcome sign for those seeking a stable Iraq.

In February of 2007, the author of this piece reported in the International Herald Tribune ("No Compromise with Extremists", February 28, 2007) that then-leader of the Iraqi Accord Front (IAF), Adnan al-Dulaimi, played an active role in the insurgency by storing car bombs in his home. At the time, officials claimed that the true culprit was a bodyguard of al-Dulaimi, senior al-Qaeda member Khudhir Farhan, who along with seven members of al-Qaeda was planning a series of attacks.

Were this an isolated incident, al-Dulaimi could possibly have been given the benefit of the doubt (against common sense), but on November 29, 2007, a raid on al-Dulaimi's compound, with the purpose of finding the killers of a prominent member of the SAC, yielded two car bombs, leading to the detention of over 40 individuals, including al-Dulaimi's son Maki Adnan al-Dulaimi. The elder al-Dulaimi, on the other hand, spent a single day under house arrest.

Al-Dulaimi is considered by many to be politically untouchable despite substantial allegations of his involvement in massacres against Shias and numerous attacks, most recently the highly publicized Army of Heaven cult attacks on Shia pilgrims during the Ashura festival in Najaf.

As to why al-Dulaimi loyalists were involved in attacks against the SAC, the answer is obvious. In less than a year, ordinary Sunni citizens working together for a common cause have done more to secure Iraq than the al-Maliki government (inclusive of the IAF) has since coming to office. Where there is effectiveness there is popular support, and where there is popular support there is political power, which for the SAC, is being gained at the expense of the IAF. Politics is a zero-sum game, and the IAF will not go down without a fight.

Al-Maliki does not fear the rise of the SAC per se, and he, in fact, sees the organization as a better alternative to the terrorist-affiliated IAF as demonstrated by his threatening to replace IAF ministers who boycotted his government with members of the SAC. What al-Maliki fears is the destabilizing effect it will have on his government if the SAC becomes a force powerful enough to challenge the IAF too quickly.

Under the worst case scenario, a Sunni civil war would ensue, erasing all of the tremendous gains that have been made in the Sunni provinces in addition to yielding a domino effect, returning Iraq to a pre-surge level of violence. This will be the final straw for the American public, and if it happens prior to the election, the candidate most likely to enact a swift withdrawal will become the next president. Understandably then, the Bush Administration is in no rush to push the SAC over the IAF, and the US Embassy has played a considerable role in slapping the wrists, but no more, of Adnan al-Dulaimi in order to maintain the status quo.

Given the SAC's resounding effectiveness in combating terror, however, the worst case scenario seems unlikely. As popular support for the SAC continues to rise, al-Dulaimi's henchmen will be hard pressed to find recruits for their cause, especially when the SAC, still funded by the United States, can pay top dollar for foot soldiers. As we have learned, whereas the leadership of an insurgency is driven by ideology, the insurgents are driven by money. Though it would be unwise for the United States and the al-Maliki government to hasten the SAC's rise, it would be equally unwise to not have a role for it in Iraq's future.

As for the continued concerns that the SAC could turn its arms on the government once it defeats al-Qaeda, certain precautions could obviate such a scenario. In this case, the best avenue would be to present the SAC with an avenue of legitimacy via political participation in the upcoming provincial elections. This will encourage the SAC to shift from military to public service endeavors rather than leaving 70,000 men with arms but no one to target. Ultimately, however, the al-Maliki government and the United States must engage the SAC with tact, attempting to maintain Iraq's short term stability while being vigilant of what is in Iraq's long term interest.